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Principal Conclusions
1.  WTO members should launch an extensive, but not overburdened, new round of trade negotiations in
Qatar in November this year for the purpose of:
•  maintaining the momentum behind the rules-based trading system and pushing ahead in further
reducing trade barriers so as to reap the substantial economic benefits that remain to be gathered,
•  enabling the problems and needs of developing countries to be carefully addressed and allowing for
improvements in the functioning of the WTO, including dispute settlement, and
•  facilitating the broadening of the discussion of multilateral trade and investment policies.
2.  WTO members should simultaneously consider how to ensure that the raising of social welfare
through trade liberalisation does not conflict with legitimate environmental objectives or undermine
social development whilst ruling out the use of trade sanctions to achieve implementation of
environmental and labour rules.
3.  A new round will provide for substantive negotiations on a range of issues such that all members of
the WTO will be able to identify areas in which they perceive benefits and generate opportunities for
mutually beneficial liberalisation within a context framed by long-term development considerations.
4.  The launch of a new round requires an injection of political will and direction in the form of a shared
vision on broad long-term objectives.
5.  The developing countries form the majority of the members at the WTO and now have a much
greater interest in international trade and the world trading system. In this context, the launch of the
new round should recognise that:
•  WTO commitments must be evaluated in the context of the overall development process;
•  mechanisms are required that allow for the effective inclusion of all members in trade negotiations
whilst ensuring that the pressure of numbers does not undermine efficient decision-making;
•  developing countries need and require suitable assistance to enhance their capabilities in dealing with
WTO and trade policy issues, including effective participation in the Dispute Settlement Procedure
and capacity-building for implementation of commitments;
•  developed countries must honour, and make clear now that they will honour, their commitments on
textiles and clothing; and
•  there is enormous potential for further trade between developing countries.
6.  On trade and environmental and labour issues,
•  the way forward is to adopt an approach of parallelism. There should be a commitment at the launch
of the round to address these issues as the new round proceeds but without any linkage with the
negotiations themselves.
•  The WTO should be involved to help ensure that the trading system itself does not undermine
internationally agreed rules regarding labour rights or the environment, but any link between
implementation of labour rights and environmental rules to trade sanctions must be rejected.
7.  Corresponding companion discussions of competition policy and investment issues related to trade
should also take place and if consensus is achieved, they could be added to the agenda of negotiations
in an appropriate way.
8.  With regard to the Dispute Settlement Procedure,
•  members should consider whether, and how, the working of the system would be improved if
compensation, in terms of lower trade barriers elsewhere, rather than retaliation, were to be
encouraged when panel rulings are not implemented.
•  The case for professional panels should be considered whilst the broader issue of the balance
between the political and legal bodies within the WTO needs to be assessed but without undermining
WTO disciplines or enforcement mechanisms.iii
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Executive Summary
he world trading system is at an important juncture. The WTO is in many ways quite
distinct from its predecessor the GATT and needs to reassess itself in the light of the
importance of developing country members, the lessons that have been learnt from the
first years of operation of the WTO and implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement and
the need for wider support from civil society, including the business community.
Why is there a need for a new round?
Doing nothing or implementing a very limited agenda of issues for negotiation are not realistic
alternatives to a comprehensive new round of multilateral trade negotiations. A continued pause
in trade liberalisation risks the real danger of ‘backsliding’ with an increase in the prevalence
and severity of non-tariff barriers to trade. A minimalist approach fails to address the
fundamental problems with the WTO that are perceived by the developing countries, and for
different reasons, civil society groups. Progress on a limited range of issues may be difficult to
achieve in the absence of a wide-range of possible trade-offs.
Launching a new round would be a positive approach to addressing the institutional issues that
the WTO faces and would help to reinforce its legitimacy and fairness. In particular a new
round would:
•  help to maintain the momentum behind the rules based trade system and push ahead with
further trade liberalisation in areas such as agriculture, services and industrial tariffs and so
reap the substantial economic benefits that remain to be gathered
•  enable the problems and needs of developing countries, and in particular of the least
developed nations, to be carefully addressed
•  allow the international community to consider carefully appropriate ways of broadening the
discussion of multilateral trade and investment policies
•  identify methods of involving civil society groups in discussions on trade policy issues and,
if feasible, formulate mechanisms by which  NGOs, including business organisations, can
contribute expertise that improves the quality of, but does not interfere with, WTO decision-
making.
•  consider how the WTO can ensure that the raising of social welfare through trade
liberalisation does not conflict with legitimate environmental objectives or undermine social
development whilst ruling out the use of trade sanctions to achieve implementation of
environmental and labour rules
•  ensure that the continuing trend in signing regional (preferential) trade agreements does not
undermine the global trading system
•  address issues relating to the operation of the Dispute Settlement System
•  discuss policies and possibly disciplines regarding new issues of particular importance, such
as electronic commerce and biotechnology
•  help to recognise, and then negotiate measures that will realise, the enormous potential for
intra-developing country trade.
TPAUL BRENTON
iv
A new round, extensive in coverage but not overloaded, will allow for substantive negotiations
on a range of issues such that all members of the WTO will be able to identify areas in which
they perceive benefits. It will allow attention to focus upon fully integrating the developing
countries into the process and procedures of the WTO whilst offering both developed and
developing countries opportunities for mutually beneficial liberalisation within a context framed
by long-term development considerations. It will also provide for changes to facilitate a clearer
relationship between the WTO and civil society groups that reflect the concerns of both
developed and developing countries.
What is needed to launch a new round?
Of primary importance to the launching of a new round is political will together with greater
tolerance, fairness and trust. What has been lacking is a sense of a shared vision on broad long-
term objectives and how the world trading system should develop. This has made consensus
much more difficult to achieve. In this context, organising the new negotiations around the
theme of pushing forward economic development may be useful. There is clearly a need for a
rapprochement between the developed and developing countries. In addition, a healthy
relationship between the EU and the US is necessary, but not sufficient for the launch of a new
round.
Framing solutions – Key issues that the round must address
The WTO in the context of economic development
Implementing Uruguay Round commitments
•  Mechanisms need to be developed for evaluating the implementation of WTO commitments
in the context of the overall development process and in particular with regard to
institutional and resource constraints. It is important, however, to distinguish between
problems of implementation and the re-negotiation of commitments.
•  For the next round, it should again be recognised that some measures may be more difficult
and costly to apply in developing countries and may have implications for resources that
require longer periods for implementation. Attention must be given to the capacities and
capabilities that are necessary for implementation of commitments and how these can be
enhanced.
Internal transparency and developing countries’ participation in the WTO
•  Mechanisms are required that allow for the effective inclusion of all members in trade
negotiations whilst making sure that the pressure of numbers does not undermine efficient
decision-making.
•  Some form of informal discussion and consensus-building is necessary for efficient
negotiations to take place. This needs to be accompanied by effective communication and
transparency within the organisation. Small-group discussions between the main players
must spread and increasingly take into account the perspectives of the broad membership
and the fact that more and more members have an increased stake in international trade.
•  Developing countries need to be able to develop capacities for dealing with WTO and trade
policy issues.
•  Related to this, the WTO could  coordinate the development of a trade policy research
network. Such networks can play an important role in stimulating cooperation and
coordination and in building consensus.THE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND
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•  There is a case for a more active role for the Director General of the WTO in terms of
facilitating negotiations and exploring possibilities. However, it is imperative that the WTO
Secretariat is, and is seen to be, neutral for it to be able to independently develop initiatives
in response to conflicts that become arise in the course of negotiations.
•  For the WTO to achieve inclusiveness of all members, the over-riding imperative of any
institutional reform is that each member must be assured that it, alone or collectively, where
resource constraints favour banding together with similar interested members, will be able
to effectively participate in negotiations on issues that are of particular importance to that
country.
Textiles and clothing
•  The developed countries must honour, and make clear now that they will honour, their
commitments on textiles and clothing both in terms of removing quantitative restrictions
and of ensuring that they will not be replaced by a surge in the use of anti-dumping or
safeguard measures.
•  Ways of monitoring the overall degree of trade policy restrictiveness in textiles and clothing
should be developed. The developed countries could then commit themselves to not
increase the level of restrictiveness in textiles and clothing. Alternatively, the developed
countries could agree to limit the use of safeguards to a specific number, say five, tariff
headings.
Anti-dumping policies
•  The next round of trade negotiations should consider how to formalise commitments
towards developing countries in the Agreement on Anti-Dumping. This could involve
discussion of a higher de minimis dumping margin and import share threshold in cases
involving developing countries, a commitment to provide information to the relevant
developing country government and to consult at all stages of the procedure, and an
exploration of ways in which assistance can be provided to allow developing country firms
to effectively participate in investigations against them.
•  The increase in the number of countries using anti-dumping policies, including developing
countries, has resulted in substantial diversity in the conduct of anti-dumping investigations
across member countries and requires further attention to be given to enhancing procedural
safeguards and transparency. This should include a review of the ‘sunset clause’ and
attention to the issue of circumvention. The latter will probably require progress to be made
on the harmonisation of non-preferential rules of origin. Progress on rules of origin would
be beneficial to all trading countries by increasing certainty and the transparency of
international trading rules.
The nature of the WTO and global governance
The ‘trade and’ issues
•  There is a real concern on the part of developing countries that if provisions were added to
the WTO to enable sanctions to be imposed for lax labour or environmental laws that these
would be abused for protectionist purposes in developed countries. It is abundantly clear
that the developing countries will not accept any linkage between trade sanctions and labour
and environmental laws and it is fruitless for developed countries to seek to exert pressure
on the developing countries to acquiesce. Nevertheless, the concerns of many civil society
groups cannot simply be ignored if there is to be broad support for the WTO and further
trade liberalisation.PAUL BRENTON
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•  The way forward is to adopt an approach of parallelism. There should be a commitment at
the launch of the round to address these issues as the new round proceeds but without any
linkage with the negotiations themselves. Thus, trade can be related to these issues in the
political arena. The WTO should be involved to help ensure that the trading system itself
does not undermine internationally agreed rules regarding labour rights or the environment.
However, any attempt to link implementation of labour rights and environmental rules to
trade sanctions must be rejected.
•  The political link could be developed in the form of the launch of multi-institutional fora on
social development (labour standards) on the one hand, and on the environment on the
other, at the same time as the new round of trade negotiations is initiated.
Trade and social development
•  Ensuring that trade and social development expand together and that the social benefits of
trade liberalisation are maximised mainly requires attention to non-trade policies, such as
labour market regulations, education and training and involves careful consideration of
technical assistance programmes and other forms of aid. The key issue for trade policy is
the timing and phasing of trade liberalisation. The challenge for the international
community is to devise ways of facilitating the adoption of necessary flanking policies to
accompany trade reform to ensure that the benefits that flow from trade are harnessed to
improve social development.
•  Initiatives on corporate responsibility and the role of voluntary codes of business conduct
can be complementary to increasing governmental responsibility for basic social standards
and the development of suitable global values.
•  A multi-institutional forum on labour standards should have a broad membership, including
the WTO and the ILO, and should provide for the joint analysis of problems, the sharing of
experiences and the search for appropriate solutions. The work of the forum should allow
for input from, and discussions with, appropriate civil society groups.
Trade and the environment
•  At present, the key issue for the WTO is how to ensure consistency and avoid conflict with
the implementation of the various multilateral environmental agreements that have been
signed, such as CITES, the Basle Convention on Hazardous Waste and the Montreal
Protocol.
•  The WTO could accept trade actions that are consistent with multilateral environmental
agreements subject to provisions that ensure that the environmental agreement concerned
has the support of the vast majority of WTO members. This would protect countries, in
particular developing countries, from pressure from other countries to adopt inappropriate
environmental policies or suffer trade sanctions as a consequence.
•  The WTO could contribute to global environmental objectives by negotiating the
liberalisation of trade in environmental products, goods and services that are deemed to be
ecologically friendly. It is likely that agreement to reduce subsidies in agriculture and
fisheries would have environmental benefits.
•  It would be useful to clarify Article XX, which provides for exceptions from GATT/WTO
obligations for specific policy objectives. This would help to make apparent when and how
the implementation of environmental policies is WTO-consistent.
•  At present, WTO rules are focused almost entirely on product rules and leave little scope for
policies that are related to production processes that are not part of the characteristics of theTHE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND
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final product, which often lie at the heart of environmental issues. This is an area where
discussions could help to clarify the existing situation and identify if additional disciplines
are feasible.
Trade and competition policy
•  Again, the most appropriate response appears to be one of initiating parallel discussions,
which can help to clarify the relevant issues and allow countries to identify their own
interests and positions. If it were to become apparent that there are certain issues, or core
practices, where consensus could be achieved, then it might be that these could be infiltrated
into the agenda of trade negotiations in an appropriate way.
•  Parallel to the work of the WTO Working Group, the Global Forum on Competition Policy
could enhance efforts being made to promulgate mutual understanding between different
authorities and to contribute to the convergence of thinking and working practices around
the world. The WTO Working Group should continue to discuss the nexus between trade
and competition policy and so contribute to greater understanding and the identification of
key issues.
Trade and investment
•  This is an issue where some members perceive that there is substantial scope for
negotiations on further disciplines, whilst at the same time there is unwavering resistance to
any negotiations from other members. Again, a policy of parallel discussions offers the
most appropriate response at present. This would allow a dialogue between all the interested
parties without formal negotiations. If these discussions were to identify for all concerned
members the scope for beneficial negotiations, then these could perhaps be introduced at
some stage during the round.
The Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP)
•  Although most observers seem to feel that the DSP is working reasonably well, and there
are no strong calls for a major overhaul of the system, there is scope for some changes to
improve the functioning of the system.
•  Mechanisms are required that encourage the offering and acceptance of compensation, in
terms of lower trade barriers elsewhere, rather than retaliation, when panel rulings are not
implemented promptly.
•  Means of facilitating the more effective participation of developing countries are required.
This requires a review of the amount and nature of technical assistance. Developing
countries need greater capacities to identify violations as well as assistance in responding to
complaints. Institutional constraints should be considered when deciding on the schedule of
implementation by developing countries of panel rulings.
•  Consideration must be given to issues relating to transparency and the involvement of
external parties such as NGOs. Openness, in terms of de-restriction of documents should be
continued and the viability of (limited) public access to hearings should be considered. In
certain instances NGOs could play a valuable role at the WTO in providing specific
expertise to improve the quality of decision-making. There are a number of practical
hurdles, however, such as, identifying the relevant organisations for particular issues, and
defining when, how and in what form and quantity submissions can be made by NGOs.
Guarantees would have to be put in place to ensure balance and fairness for all WTO
members.PAUL BRENTON
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•  The case for professional panels should be considered. The professionalisation of panels
would probably lead to the more rapid conclusion of cases and greater consistency of
outcomes. But there would be significant implications for the level of WTO resources.
•  The broader issue of the balance between the political and legal bodies within the WTO
needs to be considered. At present, it is difficult for the members to question or overturn a
decision by the Appellate body whilst at the same time the Appellate body is seen to be law-
making and involved in what are sensitive political debates. Greater scope needs to be
provided for diplomatic involvement in politically sensitive disputes, whilst ensuring that
there is no weakening of WTO disciplines and enforcement mechanisms.
Chinese accession to the WTO and the Dispute Settlement Procedure
•  The accession of China will provide a significant step towards making the WTO a truly
global institution. However, Chinese accession will raise important issues for the
functioning of the WTO.
•  The key issue regarding China’s participation is implementation and how the other
contracting parties will respond to the expected many cases of non-compliance that will
initially arise.
•  A number of approaches could help to alleviate this problem: careful discussion of
transition periods for China to implement obligations; efforts to settle cases in the
consultation phase of the DSP, the use of lobbying and overseas missions in China to effect
change; and the acceptance of concessions elsewhere when China is unable to quickly effect
the changes required by the finding of the DSP. Again, if more flexible procedures were
developed that looked at implementation in the context of the development process, then
these problems would become more manageable and less divisive.
Legitimacy and external transparency
•  The WTO has done much to increase openness but more could be done to improve the
provision of information. There could be consideration of limited public access to meetings
and panel hearings, although this is a contentious issue and faces the practical problem of
how and to whom access would be granted. On the other hand, greater openness would
improve the reputation of the WTO in the wider community. However, it has to be
recognised that there are constraints on this process of openness, because some documents,
specifically those that are subject to negotiation, must remain confidential until after
agreement has been reached.
•  The lobbying activities of NGOs should focus on national governments and parliaments;
they must not become involved in the lobbying of negotiators or secretariat officials. The
latter would be a step backwards in terms of the democratic accountability of the WTO.
Attention in the WTO should be given to how the specific expertise of particular NGOs,
including business organisations, can be effectively utilised to improve the quality of
decision-making. National governments also have a responsibility to engage in a more
effective dialogue with civil society groups and explain to the public more carefully the
rationale behind positions taken on trade policy issues.1
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1. Introduction
The WTO performs two key roles: it oversees the effective implementation of a rules-based
international trading system and it facilitates the multilateral removal of barriers to trade. The
WTO is an inter-governmental organisation that takes decisions on the basis of consensus. The
predecessor of the WTO, the GATT, concentrated upon instilling discipline and liberalising
measures at the border, tariffs and quantitative restrictions, overtly applied as part of the
members’ trade policies. More and more the GATT and now the WTO have become involved in
defining how domestic rules and regulations, introduced to achieve genuine national objectives,
can be applied without distorting trade and discriminating against products and services from
other countries.
The apparent alternatives to this global rules-based system are a situation where might (political
and economic) is right or the fragmentation of the world economy into a small number of
confrontational regional trading blocs. Neither of these alternatives is at all appealing and would
without doubt offer up a lower standard of living for the majority of people in most trading
countries. Thus, the maintenance of a fair and credible rules-based system is in the interest of all
countries, developed and developing, large and small. No feasible alternative has yet been
advanced. Nevertheless, ensuring the fairness and credibility of the system are crucial to its
survival. These are issues that need to be constantly reviewed in a dynamic organisation such as
the WTO.
The WTO and the world trade system are currently at an important juncture. The WTO now has
a very large membership and needs to redefine itself and its procedures in the light of the fact
that a majority of its members are developing countries. On the one hand, the importance of
trade and investment for economic development has been dramatically reinforced, particularly
in the form of conduits for technology and ideas. As a consequence, developing countries now
have a much larger interest in international trade and the system of rules that define the world
trading system. On the other hand, the Uruguay Round Agreement, which launched the WTO,
placed a large number of obligations on countries, some of which have been difficult to meet
given their severe resource constraints and weak institutions. For the developed countries too
there is still much to be done in anchoring the rules-based system and in providing for a more
efficient and less confrontational settlement of trade disputes. There is still enormous scope for
further liberalisation in a range of sectors, and new issues related to technological advancement,
such as electronic commerce and biotechnology, require attention.
In addition, unlike at any other time before, the WTO is subject to intense public scrutiny and
criticism. Globalisation has generated genuine fears over the impact of trade liberalisation on
the environment, on labour rights in developing countries, on wages and job security and on
cultural identities. In many cases the concerns for non-trade issues such as basic labour rights
are best dealt with in other institutions that focus primarily on these issues. The WTO cannot
survive in a vacuum, however, and increasing contact and dialogue with civil society must be
developed whilst preserving the independence and impartiality of the secretariat. Nevertheless,
the primary responsibility for responding to the needs of domestic constituencies must lie with
national politicians. The WTO must develop ways, in conjunction with other international
organisations, to ensure that trade liberalisation does not conflict with internationally agreed
environmental or social objectives.
In short, the WTO is facing a number of difficult issues. The extent to which it deals effectively
with these issues will largely determine the evolution of the world trading system. If it fails toPAUL BRENTON
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maintain the confidence of the developing countries in the rules-based system and achieve
conciliation with civil society groups whilst at the same time maintaining the motor behind the
cooperative rather than adversarial approach to international trade policy, then there is a real
possibility that protectionist sentiments could rise and the system will move backwards to the
detriment of global economic welfare.
In this report we argue that these issues would be best addressed in the context of a new round
of multilateral trade negotiations. In the first section we outline more specifically why a new
round is needed and then what is necessary for the round to be launched. In the second part of
the report we concentrate more on the substance of what the round should contain and identify
two key elements: addressing the needs of developing countries and the nature of the WTO in
the context of global governance.
2. Why a new round?
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which gave birth to the WTO, lasted
almost nine years and was the most comprehensive and complicated of the trade rounds
completed since the Second World War. There are many facets of the WTO and the Uruguay
Round agreement that have been a considerable success and have certainly led to a more stable,
rules-based environment in which international commerce can be efficiently undertaken. At the
same time, the Uruguay Round has generated immense controversy and the WTO is perceived
by many groups in society as being undemocratic and presiding over a system that is unfair and
that compromises genuine objectives regarding the environment, social values and economic
development.
Implementation of the WTO and the Uruguay Round agreements has exposed a number of
problems and deficiencies. This is not entirely surprising. Some of these can be classified as
teething problems and should be relatively straightforward to overcome. Other are more
fundamental and require very careful handling. Developing countries have experienced
considerable problems in implementing some of the commitments they assumed; the lack of
effective liberalisation of textiles and clothing and agriculture in developed countries has
created the impression of an unbalanced outcome of the round; the WTO is seen as secretive
and remote from wider society, as well as insensitive to genuine concerns regarding the impact
of trade on the environment and social development; and there are distinct problems regarding
the effective participation of members in a large and expanding organisation that is quite
different from its predecessor. These problems have been compounded by very public conflicts
between the US and the EU over the implementation of some of the obligations they have
adopted.
Why then is there a need for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations at this particular
time? Before detailing exactly what a new round could achieve, we briefly examine the
alternatives to a new round: a pause in trade liberalisation or a very minimalist approach that
concentrates on a limited range of issues where further negotiations were mandated under the
Uruguay Round agreement (agriculture and services) and where reassessments of specific parts
of the agreement were envisaged, such as, the TRIPS agreement.
The idea behind a pause in trade negotiations is that the Uruguay Round was a far-reaching and
momentous agreement and that careful consideration should be given to its achievements before
proceeding to further liberalisation. This would also avoid further confrontation with those
groups in society that are opposed to further negotiations. Whilst not denying the need for a
careful review of the Uruguay Round Agreement, and in particular the economic implications,
we argue that delaying further liberalisation would be very dangerous for the world trading
system.THE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND
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The basic view underlying both of these alternatives is that the pace of globalisation is too fast
and that governments should seek to put a brake on international economic integration to allow
individuals greater time to adjust to economic change. Clearly, globalisation poses important
adjustment costs for some individuals, and there is a case for greater discussion of suitable
policies that individual countries could implement to limit these costs. Nevertheless, it is not at
all clear that refraining from further trade negotiations will necessarily constrain the pace of
globalisation.  Technological change and private decisions on investment and trade will
continue apace. On the other hand, there is a real possibility that refraining from further
negotiations will lead to significant steps backwards, in terms of the openness and stability of
the international trading system. This would have a significantly negative impact on welfare
throughout the world.
It is often argued that a continual programme of multilateral trade liberalisation talks is
necessary to sustain the momentum towards internationally open markets. This reflects the view
that failure to maintain such pressure does not preserve the status quo, but leads to a
retrenchment from liberal trade. The usual analogy is that of a bicycle being peddled uphill.
Once the pedals stop turning, then the bicycle rolls backwards. Thus, in a dynamically changing
environment, the choice for the international community is not the status quo but rather whether
to participate in framing the corridors along which globalisation travels or to allow
uncoordinated economic integration together with the risk of a breakdown in trade relations
between countries.
The minimalist view generates a small amount of momentum for the bicycle but fails to address
the fundamental issues that became apparent in Seattle and that prevented many member
countries from wishing to launch a new round at that particular point. Specifically, the
suitability of the institutional framework of the WTO and existing negotiating procedures were
called into question. We discuss these issues in more detail below but note here that a
minimalist agenda would not properly address the needs of developing countries, which are best
considered in the context of a round. The developing countries need an extensive approach to
further negotiations.
1 At the same time, however, the scope of the negotiations must not become
overloaded and too burdensome for effective participation by developing country members.
This is the delicate balance that those who lead in defining the agenda for the next round must
respect.
Furthermore, progress under the sector-by-sector approach that underlies the cautious approach
to further trade liberalisation is likely to be much slower, and the political will to find agreement
in the talks on agriculture and services appears to be weak in the absence of a broader approach
with more scope for compromise and trade-offs. A new trade round would enhance the prospect
of a successful conclusion of the negotiations on agriculture and services. Putting them in the
context of a larger trade round would make it easier to identify trade-offs outside agriculture,
thus enhancing the possibility of achieving substantial results.
In addition, the successful conclusion of negotiations for particular sectors would hinder the
prospects for a new, more extensive round in the future. Those who achieve their objectives
with limited sectoral negotiations will exert less pressure for general liberalisation in the future.
Comprehensive negotiations offer a wide range of economic gains across sectors and issues and
therefore a multitude of potential winners across all member countries. This in turn will increase
the political support for further liberalisation.
                                                                
1 Stiglitz (1999).PAUL BRENTON
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2.1 The case for a new round
As each round of trade talks has brought discipline to certain aspects of commercial policy, it
has become apparent that there are other substantial barriers to trade, previously hidden or
obscured, which require subsequent attention. The lowering of tariffs, at which the GATT and
WTO have been extremely successful, has been likened to the draining of a swamp: as the water
level falls, all the other snags that constrain trade are revealed. Many of these snags are related
to the way in which national regulatory policies are defined and implemented. These are the
issues of deep integration.
In this way trade liberalisation becomes deeper over time, and the agenda for trade talks
becomes more and more expansive. Related to this is that those who seek protection from trade
will redirect their efforts away from policies that are effectively constrained by multilateral rules
towards different forms of intervention. Thus, for example, as the ability of governments to
raise tariffs to placate domestic groups lobbying for protection has been restrained, there has
been increasing pressure for intervention to stem imports through the use of non-tariff barriers,
including anti-dumping and safeguard measures.
In addition, technological progress is throwing up a range of new issues that have important
implications for regulatory policies and international trade. Paramount amongst these are
electronic commerce and biotechnology. A new round would enable the WTO to discuss and
develop forward-looking policies on these issues rather than react retrospectively if a new round
were to be delayed. Similarly, the continually changing structure of national production, and in
particular the rising importance of services, requires attention and also entails that the new
round must have a broad focus.
These are the standard arguments that have been put forward in favour of successive rounds of
multilateral trade liberalisation talks. They are equally pertinent to the launching of a new round
now. The economic gains from further liberalisation are likely to be significant particularly if
progress is made in sectors where liberalisation has been largely postponed in the past, i.e.
agriculture and textiles and clothing, and in services sectors where trade barriers often remain
substantial. Benefits from increasing certainty in undertaking international commerce are
difficult to quantify but are probably large. Such gains tend to be proportionately much larger
for relatively small, open economies that are particularly vulnerable to adverse changes in
external market conditions.
These arguments are perhaps even more compelling at a time when economic growth in the US
and other industrialised countries is slowing. The pressure for protection from trade tends to rise
during downturns in the economic cycle. Many fear that without a new round, there is a real
danger of ‘backsliding’ with an increase in the prevalence and severity of non-tariff barriers to
trade.
2 However, an important new ingredient has been added to the pot which has radically
altered the international trade policy environment and which substantially enhances the case
behind and the need for a new round of trade talks.
One of the defining features of the Uruguay Round that distinguishes it from earlier agreements
is the comprehensive inclusion of developing countries
3 into the WTO. The developing
countries form the majority of the membership of the WTO. Other factors that distinguish the
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3 Throughout we rather crudely talk about the developing countries as a bloc. However, the make-up of
the group varies across issues and it is often useful to distinguish the problems of the least developed
nations. In addition, some developing countries have been active participants in the WTO and GATT for
many years and do not fall easily into the categorisation here. Nevertheless, what we describe are the
main trends that have dominated the evolution of the GATT and the WTO and that are now important in
determining its future direction.THE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND
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WTO are the increased use of the legally binding Dispute Settlement Procedure and the
incorporation of agriculture, services and issues such as intellectual property rights under global
trading rules.
The Single Undertaking of the WTO entails that all of the Contracting Parties have equal
obligations and therefore, equal rights. Previously, industrial countries dominated the GATT,
which concentrated at first upon the removal of high tariff barriers. As more trade rounds were
initiated, the industrialised countries added more issues to the agenda, but the developing
countries were allowed to sign up to those provisions (codes) that that wished to. With the
Single Undertaking the developing countries have had to adopt and implement the whole
package of WTO rules.
The decision to participate fully in the WTO was not a policy adopted in isolation by individual
developing countries but was in most cases part of a conscious policy towards general economic
reform and liberalisation. Trade liberalisation is an integral, but not the only part of a broad
package of policy reforms designed to push forward economic development. A new round of
trade liberalisation is necessary to allow developing countries to anchor and enhance the reform
programmes that they have adopted. A new round offers these countries the prospect of more
effective participation in the negotiations so as to tailor further liberalisation to be more
consistent with their developments needs.
In this context the developed countries should seek to instigate an approach to a new round that
facilitates a more constructive, strategic and long-term approach. This requires strong political
leadership and interest. The actual negotiations will of course be based upon hard bargaining
between government officials in the WTO. Thus, what is required is a careful consideration of
the agenda to allow key issues from a long-term development perspective to be given sufficient
priority and a more flexible approach in considering the inevitable trade-offs that are generated
by the negotiations.
Trade liberalisation remains a vital part of the process of reform launched by the developing
countries. More open trade not only allows countries to specialise and reap the benefits of their
comparative advantages and exploit the larger markets that liberal trade provides for but also to
benefit from the flow of knowledge and ideas that characterise the modern industrial
environment, and which offer the prospects of raising productivity throughout the economy.
The removal of restrictions on foreign commerce acts to increase competition and undermine
inefficient domestic monopolies, encouraging the more productive use of resources and
bringing the benefits of lower prices to consumers. The adoption of international customs
practices helps to constrain the opportunities for corruption whilst, more generally, the effective
implementation of global trading rules allows countries to lock in domestic reforms and
provides a valuable signal to companies operating in a country that open access to overseas
markets for parts and other inputs will be maintained.
Whilst the opening of the domestic market is itself beneficial, another key aspect of the
development process is access to overseas markets. Participation in the WTO provides a
measure of certainty for domestic firms selling in overseas markets that arbitrary measures that
cut off access to those markets will not be imposed by overseas governments. In addition,
industrial output in developing countries tends to be concentrated upon relatively few sectors
with agriculture and textiles and clothing usually dominating. Hence, agreements that improve
the extent and certainty of access in these products will have a relatively large positive
economic impact upon developing countries. Here it is worth noting the large potential that
exists for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade between developing countries.
Furthermore, a new round could play an instrumental role in attaining that potential.
At the same time, it must be recognised that whilst trade liberalisation brings real benefits it
does not come without problems and costs for certain groups in society. Policy-makers have aPAUL BRENTON
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serious responsibility address these problems. This is true for both developed and developing
countries. For both groups of countries, however, the costs of not liberalising are likely to be
much larger. The challenge for international policy-makers is to maximise the number of people
who have a stake in trade liberalisation and to see that necessary flanking policies are put in
place to ensure that social development and environmental sustainability proceed apace with
commercial development.
For the developed countries there are clear benefits to be had from addressing the needs of the
developing countries and enhancing the reform processes that have been put in motion. Not only
would this stabilise the rules-based trading system and contribute to a positive vision of the
future of the WTO, it would also help to ensure that developing countries maintain and enhance
market access in sectors of interest to developed countries. There is also a range of issues where
the developed countries would benefit from further negotiations, from effective liberalisation of
trade in agricultural products, the broadening and deepening of liberalisation of services, reform
of the Dispute Settlement Procedure to discussions of biotechnology and other new issues.
The WTO also needs to redefine its relationship with civil society. On the one hand this
involves opening up documents and data to external inspection and analysis. In the modern
information age, highly secretive organisations have difficulty in establishing their legitimacy in
the broader society. Lack of external transparency in the past has contributed to some
misconceptions regarding the WTO and its role. Lack of effective dialogue with the wider
public has led to the view that the WTO is undemocratic and that the process of trade
liberalisation has been dictated by large multinational companies. Substantial steps have been
taken to correct these views, but more needs to be done.
The more difficult challenge is to address the demands from NGOs for more active participation
in the functions of the WTO, such as the Dispute Settlement Procedure. This is particularly
sensitive given the asymmetric endowment of NGOs between developed and developing
countries. Nevertheless, there is a need to consider how mechanisms for improved openness at
the WTO can be developed which contribute to the broader discussion and assessment of
multilateral trade policies. In addition, there needs to be some contemplation of how NGOs
could contribute to improving the quality and efficiency of decision-making, although it has to
be recognised that there are some important practical hurdles that make some observers
extremely reluctant to countenance such a development. This relates primarily to the dispute
settlement mechanism. Attention to these issues of external transparency are necessary for
cementing the legitimacy of the organisation in the wider society given the strong apprehensions
that many individuals harbour about the process of trade liberalisation and globalisation. In
general, however, the most appropriate route for NGOs to participate in trade policy issues is
via national politicians and governments and this is where the primary responsibility for
dialogue with wider society on trade policy issues rests.
Some of the main concerns of civil society groups relate to the so-called ‘trade and’ issues, and
in particular, the relationship between trade and the environment and trade and basic labour
rights. Again, the way in which the WTO responds to these issues will be important in fostering
a more positive relationship with the wider society. On the issue of links with civil society there
are quite different perspectives in different members of the WTO such that moving forward may
be best facilitated through a comprehensive discussion in the context of a new round of
negotiations. These are very sensitive issues and have to be considered carefully. As we shall
argue below, however, it is clear that the developing countries will in no way accept any link
between a lack of compliance with environmental or labour rules and the use of trade sanctions
in the WTO.
In sum, there are several reasons why a new round of negotiations is needed:THE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND
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•  The alternatives to a new comprehensive round of doing nothing or negotiating on a very
limited set of issues are clearly less attractive.
•  A comprehensive new round will allow for substantive negotiations on a range of issues
identified by all members of the WTO in which they perceive benefits.
•  Such a round will allow attention to focus upon fully integrating the developing countries
into the process and procedures of the WTO whilst offering both developed and developing
countries opportunities for mutually beneficial liberalisation within a context framed by
long-term development considerations.
•  A round will also provide for changes to facilitate an improved relationship and dialogue
between the WTO and civil society groups that reflect the concerns of both developed and
developing countries.
Having said this there are a number of prerequisites that are required before a round can be
successfully launched. Without these in place there is little point in launching a round as the
damage that a failed round could cause the WTO might be much greater than that from not
launching a round at all. It is to this issue that we now turn.
2.2 What is needed to launch the round?
Of primary importance to the launch of a new round is political will and a desire to push
forward with trade liberalisation and the enhancement of the WTO together with greater
tolerance, fairness and trust. A consensus to launch a new round will only be achieved if all
members recognise the aspirations of each of their trading partners and that, as in the past,
members (or groups of members) with a significant interest in a particular issue must be
effectively involved in the relevant negotiations.
As in previous rounds, politicians must be prepared to face up to tough and difficult decisions
and be willing to compromise on their basic objectives to achieve an overall agreement. The
launch of a round will be much easier if countries adopt a much more positive approach. What
was lacking in Seattle was any sense of a shared vision on broad long-term objectives and how
the world trading system should develop. In this context organising the new negotiations around
the theme of pushing forward economic development may be useful. Given the failure in
Seattle, it is clear that the concerns of developing countries must be assuaged. We discuss below
what the agenda of the round should contain for the developing countries, but note here that
progress has recently been made in addressing some of the complaints regarding the
mechanisms governing the participation of the developing countries in the WTO.
It is apparent that ongoing work in a range of committees of the WTO is preparing the
foundation for future negotiations. Similarly, in agriculture and services, where negotiations are
mandated, essential groundwork is being undertaken, but formal negotiations have yet to
commence and no deadline for the completion of any deal has been set. However, the time has
now arrived whereby  an injection of political direction and support is required if actual
negotiations are to commence.
So there is a need for a rapprochement between the developed and developing countries. In
addition, the attitudes of the EU and the US to a new round and to each other are also crucial.
Success in launching a new round will not be achieved without the active participation of both
the EU and the US. The relationship between the EU and the US on trade remains fundamental
to the overall health of the rules-based trading system and to the prospects for the successful
launch of a new round. A healthy relationship between the EU and the US is a ‘necessary,
although not sufficient, condition for the vibrancy of the multilateral trading system’.
4
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The EU and the US also bear a heavy responsibility in demonstrating the effective
implementation of the obligations they have accepted and in complying with the findings of
panel reports when disputes arise. Unfortunately, the EU and the US through their actions on
issues such as bananas, beef hormones and tax policy on exports have given a strong impression
of being adversaries rather than demonstrating a clear joint vision and a shared purpose. By
allowing the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure to become embroiled in areas where WTO
disciplines are less precise and poorly developed, both parties have used the WTO to ‘impose
judicial solutions for political failures’.
5 Good faith, upon which the continued success of the
rules-based international trading system relies, must be clearly shown by the leading trading
nations.
Thus,
•  A new round can only be launched on the basis of consensus.
•  Of primary importance to the launching of a new round is political will together greater
tolerance, fairness and trust.
•  Such a consensus will have to be organised around leadership by the EU and US.
The EU and the US must ultimately make the decision that if there is no consensus then a new
round should not be contemplated at present. The WTO cannot afford another disaster as
occurred in Seattle at the next ministerial meeting in Qatar. The EU and the US must take the
responsibility to ensure that this does not happen.  We proceed below to look in more detail at
the problems that the WTO faces and suggest some solutions which could improve the
functioning of the WTO, repair the distrust of the developing countries and forge working links
with civil society. Before doing this we briefly describe important features of the WTO which
distinguish it from its predecessor the GATT and help provide some context with which to
assess how the WTO can proceed from here.
3. The nature of the WTO
It is worth noting here that the WTO is a radically different organisation than the GATT,
although it must not be forgotten that the essential inter-governmental nature of the organisation
and its predecessor has not changed. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the WTO has a much broader
membership than the GATT. With the Single Undertaking, the developing countries are equal
partners in the WTO. In the GATT the number of active partners driving the direction of the
organisation was much smaller. The clubs which generated consensus under the GATT did not
function in the run up to Seattle. Thus, the broadening of the membership requires changes in
the way that the WTO functions.
Future negotiations will have to be more effectively organised to ensure the effective inclusion
of all Contracting Parties in the negotiating processes (this clearly did not happen at Seattle).
These institutional problems will increase in magnitude with the accession of China. Note also
that the coming years will also see the accession of a range of other countries including the large
CIS countries: Russia and Ukraine. Thus, the WTO faces a major challenge in embracing new
members whilst improving the effectiveness of the organisation. The increase in scale of the
organisation also raises of the issue of how to involve all members in the running of the WTO
under the guise of internal transparency whilst at the same time preserving the efficiency of
operation of the organisation.
Secondly, the WTO oversees a more complex system of rules and a broader range of policies
than the GATT. Amongst the new issues covered by the WTO are the so-called ‘trade and’
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issues relating to, amongst others, trade and investment, the environment, and intellectual
property.
Third, the WTO is subject to a much greater level of external interest and pressure than was the
GATT. The WTO cannot proceed in isolation from the scrutiny of wider society. Efforts are
needed towards greater openness, more effort is required to place the WTO into the broader
international policy context and to participate in discussions relating to issues of concern to
NGOs and the wider society, in particular, the environment and social policy. Specifically, the
WTO should demonstrate that trade liberalisation is not its objective per se, but rather economic
advancement and the raising of social welfare and that these are best promulgated in a system
where there are clear and effectively enforced rules which prevent discrimination and arbitrary
changes in policy which undermine market access. As such the links between trade and
investment and social and environmental progress need to be more explicitly evaluated, as will
be discussed below.
Finally, the WTO has a much more effective Dispute Settlement Procedure, which has led to an
increase in the importance of judicial settlements to trade policy conflicts. The role of politics
and diplomacy is solving disputes is less prevalent than under the GATT.
4. Framing solutions
4.1 Addressing the needs of developing countries
The different nature of the WTO compared to the GATT, and the increasing importance of trade
and investment to the development processes being implemented in many countries, means that
the interests of developing countries are now much more prominent. This was not properly
reflected at Seattle but it is generally accepted that attention needs to be given to the specific
needs of developing countries. Here we discuss what actions can be taken to help the
developing countries maximise the benefits of their participation in the WTO. We consider first
the particular problems that the developing countries have encountered since the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO.
4.1.1 Applying Uruguay Round commitments
The Uruguay Round, unlike any previous multilateral trade agreement, compelled developing
country members to not only reduce border trade barriers, such as tariffs and quantitative
restrictions, but also to implement reforms to trade procedures, such as customs valuation, and
to adopt commitments with regard to domestic regulations concerning for example, technical,
sanitary and phytosanitary standards and laws regarding the protection of intellectual property.
From an administrative point of view, changes to tariffs are relatively easy to implement in all
countries. Domestic rules and regulations, however, are based on and supported by institutions
that are characteristically weak in developing countries and whose strengthening and reform can
require substantial investment of resources.
A particular criticism that the developing countries have had with regard to the Uruguay Round
is that implementation periods given to meet their commitments were arbitrary and did not
directly take into account their development problems or their capacity to implement them.
Thus, for example, the decision to commit resources in many developing countries to establish
an enquiry point on technical regulations, as is required by the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade, has important implications for resources that can be directed to other institutions that
play a crucial role in the development process. New institutions require accommodation,
equipment and manpower, which must be appropriately trained, and the development of
systems of procedures. It has been calculated that areas covered by the Uruguay RoundPAUL BRENTON
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Agreement can swallow up the whole of the annual development assistance for a country.
6
Clearly the costs of implementation can be very high.
The dissatisfaction of the developing countries also reflects their perceived lack of effective
inclusion in the Uruguay Round negotiations on many of these issues and that much of the
agreement reflects rules that work well in developed countries given their advanced institutional
capacity. These rules may not work as well in countries with severe institutional constraints.
Given resource limitations, choices must be made as to where institutional capacities should be
increased. The view of the developing countries is that these choices should be made in the
context of economic development rather than just in blind obedience to Uruguay Round
commitments. This is not to say that the changes that the Uruguay Round obliges developing
countries to make are harmful per se; most, in fact, are very important in the context of creating
a modern open flourishing economy. Rather, the issue is that some of the changes required
should not take precedence over other development objectives but the timescale for
implementation should be assessed in the context of the overall development process. The
challenge is to agree upon mechanisms that allow for such assessments. Clearly, developing a
closer relationship with the World Bank and other development agencies is important in this
respect.
The Uruguay Round agreements typically provide provisions for technical assistance, but these
commitments are not always binding on developed countries, nor do they allow for delayed
implementation or extensions beyond agreed deadlines. These provisions have been exploited in
certain cases, but overall, the amount of technical assistance has been small relative to the
problems developing countries face.
Thus, in terms of applying the Uruguay Round commitments, implementation should be judged
against a development yardstick. An important distinction, however, must be made between
implementation and  re-negotiation. Whilst recognising the immense problems of
implementation that some countries encounter, it is also apparent that other countries are
making less effort towards implementation and there is a genuine concern that the value of
commitments made in earnest negotiations should not subsequently be undermined. Hence,
greater flexibility must not mean that the changes necessary to meet WTO commitments are
simply put off. There needs to be some form of monitoring to ensure that adjustments are taking
place and that where technical assistance is provided its contribution is carefully assessed. The
current approach under the Integrated Framework is weak in this respect and lacks resources.
7
In the next round, demands for further commitments on rules and regulations should be
considered in the context of the development process. It should be recognised that the
introduction of some measures may be more difficult and costly in developing countries and
may have implications for resources that require longer periods for implementation. In the next
round, developing-country support for new obligations should be reciprocated with binding
technical assistance designed to build capacities for implementation.
4.1.2 Internal transparency and developing countries’ participation in the WTO
The WTO, as did the GATT, works on the basis of consensus, but the process of consensus-
building broke down in the preparations for the Seattle ministerial.
8 In the GATT, the
negotiating agenda and the negotiations themselves tended to be driven by a small group of
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developed countries, particularly the US and the EU. Thus, the agenda for the various rounds
under the GATT primarily reflected the interests of the OECD countries. However, the other
countries could choose whether or not to adopt the commitments that were agreed upon as a
result of these negotiations and were often offered what was known as special and differential
treatment. Thus, the developing countries did not block an overall agreement because specific
demands were not made upon them whilst under the most-favoured nation provision of the
GATT, they were able to benefit from the liberalisation by the developed countries and from the
increasing strength of the rules-based system. In short, under the GATT a few countries set the
agenda, but there was no compulsion on any country to implement the results. On the other
hand, the agenda for negotiations did not reflect the interests of most of the developing
countries, such that trade in textiles and clothing products and in agriculture ￿ sectors of
particular interest to developing countries ￿ were excluded from the general tendency towards
more liberal trade.
The membership of the WTO is much larger than that of the GATT; the developing countries
are equal partners and are in the majority. The continued legitimacy of the organisation requires
that all members are involved in the WTO and in the negotiation of commitments. This did not
fully happen in the Uruguay Round negotiations, in part because the ‘single undertaking’ did
not materialise until towards the end of the round, so that many countries accepted obligations
in whose negotiation they had played no part.
This problem came to a head in the preparations for Seattle when mechanisms derived from the
GATT could not cope with the new reality of the structure and nature of the WTO. The
traditional informal ‘green room’ process in which a select group of countries meet to decide on
key issues excluded too many interested parties and led to the perception of a division between
rich and poor countries. With the increased membership of the WTO and the need to provide for
greater participation for developing countries, the ‘green room’ process has become too
inflexible and inefficient.
New mechanisms are required that allow for the effective inclusion of all members in trade
negotiations whilst making sure that the pressure of numbers does undermine efficient decision-
making. It is clear, however, that some form of informal discussion and consensus-building are
necessary for efficient negotiations to take place. This needs to be accompanied by effective
communication and transparency within the organisation so that all members who so wish are
aware of the issues being discussed and of the outcomes of the informal discussions. The
objective must be to ensure that small group discussions between the main players spread and
increasingly take account of the perspectives of the broad membership.
There also needs to be an appropriate balance between the interests of large and small countries
at the WTO. Large countries need to have a significant role, but there have to be checks on their
power ￿ although not to the degree that these countries deem it more effective to exercise their
influence outside of the WTO. The precise way in which membership of informal small
discussion groups is constituted can probably only be resolved as part of a new round since it
will necessarily entail compromises by some of the members. It is worth remembering that
whatever the composition of these negotiating groups within the WTO framework, the approval
of small countries is necessary for the confirmation of any trade deal.
Another important element in this issue is that developing countries are able to develop
capacities for dealing with WTO and trade policy issues. Some developing countries are unable
to maintain a permanent diplomatic presence in Geneva. This must be taken into account in the
dissemination of information by the WTO. There is also a need for greater expertise on the
relevant issues to be available to national administrations to enable careful analysis of issues
under negotiation and the derivation of country positions. This would allow for more detailed
and technical exchanges of views prior to actual negotiations that would demonstrate which
solutions are feasible and where the boundaries and limits for a possible agreement may lie. AnPAUL BRENTON
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important contribution to this process would be for the WTO to oversee the development of a
research network comprising the international institutions, universities and research centres in
both developed and developing countries and relevant NGOs. Knowledge networks can play an
important role in stimulating cooperation and coordination and in building consensus.
9
Finally, there is a case for a more active role for the Director General of the WTO in terms of
facilitating negotiations and exploring possibilities. However, it is imperative that the WTO
Secretariat is, and is seen to be, neutral for it to be able to independently develop initiatives in
response to conflicts that arise in the negotiations.
The effective participation of all members is an issue that has received careful attention in the
WTO and a number of initiatives regarding internal transparency and confidence-building
measures have been instigated. As noted above, a resolution of the problems concerning
participation in negotiations can only be solved as part of a new round of negotiations. For the
WTO to achieve inclusiveness of all members, the over-riding imperative of any institutional
reform is that each member, or group of members where that is more appropriate due to shared
interests and lacks of individual resources, must be able to participate in negotiations on issues
that are of particular importance.
4.1.3 Textiles and clothing
Of major relevance to the developing countries is the agreed phase-out of the multi-fibre
agreement (MFA). Under the Uruguay Round the developed countries consented to remove the
raft of quantitative restrictions on their imports of textiles and clothing products from
developing countries which have distorted trade in these sectors for over 40 years since the
(now comically titled) Short-Term Agreement. The agreement under the Uruguay Round has
allowed the developed countries to delay effective liberalisation until the end of the phase-out
on 31 December 2004. In practice, the agreement allowed unimportant non-binding quotas to be
removed first with the most important binding quotas preserved until the last. This in itself was
a disappointment for many developing countries and has been compounded by the fear that
quota liberalisation may not actually be implemented at the end of 2004 and even if it is there
may be a spate of anti-dumping and safeguard measures in the developed countries which will
prevent any real improvement in market access.
The developed countries must honour, and make clear now that they will honour, their
commitments on textiles and clothing both in terms of the removal of quantitative restrictions
and that they will not be replaced by a surge in the use of anti-dumping or safeguard measures.
If this does not occur, it is most unlikely that there will be a successful conclusion to the next
round and the confidence of the developing countries in the system will be severely
undermined.
In practical terms, it would be useful to have an overall index of trade policy restrictiveness in
textiles and clothing in each importing country for each partner which incorporates the impact
of any anti-dumping and safeguard measures. The developed countries should then commit that
trade restrictiveness in textiles and clothing will not increase for any supplier in any market after
2004. If there are subsequent increases in anti-dumping or safeguard measures that raise this
index, then compensating reductions in tariffs would have to be provided. Alternative
suggestions are that the developed countries agree to limit the use of safeguards to a specific
number, say five, tariff headings.
10
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4.1.4 Anti-dumping policies
Attitudes and approaches towards anti-dumping policies vary enormously. On the one hand,
many developing countries, whilst increasingly becoming users of such policies themselves, are
demanding greater restraints on the use of such measures so that for these countries, such
policies must be on the agenda of a new round. On the other hand, some developed countries
adamantly insist, in the face of enormous pressure from domestic groups, that anti-dumping and
safeguard measures are absolutely crucial policies to ensure fair competition given the strong
discipline inhibiting the use of other trade measures, and so there is little desire to enter into any
substantive negotiations on anti-dumping measures. In light of these conflicting views, what
could be done in the context of a new round.
Within the context of a rules-based system, it is important that anti-dumping laws are seen to be
fair and predictable. For the law to be applied fairly, it is important that all those facing
complaints are able to effectively defend themselves. At present the complexities and costs of
complying with anti-dumping investigations in many countries make it difficult for firms in
developing and transition countries to fully represent themselves. The costs of replying to
questionnaires,
11 of possible attendance at meetings in the country where the investigation is
initiated and other related demands are often substantial for developing country firms. Many
developing country governments are unable to provide resources to support and assist firms
subject to anti-dumping investigations in overseas markets. Thus, there appear to be
asymmetries in the system in the extent to which firms in developed and developing countries
are able to respond to anti-dumping petitions.
There are provisions in the Uruguay Round Agreement on anti-dumping policies that ‘special
regard must be given by developed country Members to the special situation of developing
country Members when considering the application of anti-dumping measures…Possibilities of
constructive remedies…shall be explored before applying anti-dumping duties where they
would affect the essential interests of developing country Members’. However, in practice it
would appear that in applying their anti-dumping legislation the developed countries ‘do not
distinguish between developed and developing countries’.
12
Thus, the next round of trade negotiations could usefully consider how to formalise this
commitment and make its effect more concrete. This could involve discussion of a higher de
minimis dumping margin and import share threshold in cases involving developing countries, a
commitment to provide information to the relevant developing country government and to
consult at all stages of the procedure, and consideration of ways in which assistance can be
provided to allow developing country firms to effectively participate in investigations against
them.
Agreement on these issues concerning the treatment of developing countries would not require
any substantive procedural changes to anti-dumping laws. However, there will also be demands
for changes to clarify further the procedures to be followed in identifying dumping and in
calculating dumping margins and injury. A feature of the 1990s has been the increasing number
of countries, including developing countries, to implement anti-dumping procedures. This has
instilled substantial diversity in the conduct of anti-dumping investigations across member
countries. Thus, further attention to enhancing procedural safeguards and transparency seems
warranted.
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There is also concern that the ‘sunset clause’, which provides a time limit to anti-dumping
duties, may be used to legitimise the continuation of duties for five years even if the domestic
industry has recovered and the injury has been diminished or removed. Finally, the issue of
circumvention, when firms subject to anti-dumping measures divert components and undertake
final assembly in other countries, including the importing country, was not adequately
addressed in the Uruguay Round and needs to be reassessed. This will probably require progress
to be made on the harmonisation of non-preferential rules of origin, where discussions have
been deadlocked at the World Customs Organisation, partly because of the absence of any
multilateral agreement on anti-circumvention measures. Progress on rules of origin would be
beneficial to all trading countries by increasing certainty and transparency of international trade
rules.
Thus, as part of refocusing the WTO in the light of the participation of the developing countries,
the next round of trade talks should:
•  Develop mechanisms to assess implementation of WTO commitments in the context of the
overall development process and in particular with regard to institutional and resource
constraints, whilst technical assistance that raises the capacity for implementation should be
provided.
•  Identify means of allowing for the effective inclusion of all developing countries in trade
negotiations whilst maintaining efficient decision-making. The WTO must ensure that each
member is able to participate in negotiations, and that their positions are taken into account
on issues that are of particular importance to that country.
•  Identify ways to assist developing countries to develop capacities for dealing with WTO and
trade policy issues.
•  Consider the case for a more active role for the Director General of the WTO in terms of
facilitating negotiations and exploring possibilities.
•  Ensure that the developed countries must honour, and make clear now that they will honour,
their commitments on textiles and clothing both in terms of the removal of quantitative
restrictions and provide assurance that they will not be replaced by a surge in the use of
anti-dumping or safeguard measures.
•  Consider how to make concrete commitments towards developing countries in the
Agreement on Anti-Dumping.
•  Give further attention to enhancing procedural safeguards and transparency in provisions
regarding anti-dumping and safeguard actions. This should include a review of the ‘sunset
clause’ and attention to the issue of circumvention. In conjunction with the latter, there must
be progress on the harmonisation of non-preferential rules of origin.
4.2 The nature of the WTO and global governance
4.2.1 The ‘trade and’ issues
The traditional focus of the GATT and the WTO has been on tariffs and other trade policies
applied at the border. As noted above, as tariffs have been reduced attention has shifted to other
non-border policies that restrict market access for foreign companies. Often these policies, such
as technical regulations, play no overt role in the trade policy of the country concerned but can
have the indirect effect of discriminating against imports. Recently there have been demands for
the WTO to consider policies that are not directly related to market access but that may distort
competitive conditions. At the forefront of these demands have been labour rights and the
environment. The pressure for the WTO to consider these originates almost entirely fromTHE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND
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groups and governments in the developed world. One reason the WTO is singled out for these
issues is that it is perceived to have been a successful organisation with an effective
enforcement mechanism, whilst existing agencies that address these issues more directly are
deemed to be weak in this respect. The GATT and the WTO have been successful, however,
because they have had a narrow focus with limited responsibilities. Burdening the WTO with an
increasing range of issues that do not fall directly within its remit would certainly undermine the
organisation and reduce its effectiveness.
In addition, targeting the WTO as the forum for these issues is not useful since it implies that
they will be addressed only in their relation to trade, which is at best only a partial response. In
fact, the academic literature clearly demonstrates that using trade sanctions to penalise countries
for lack of implementation of basic labour rights or certain environmental rules can be
counterproductive in terms of further harming those whose rights are being denied or leading to
further environmental degradation. There can be no guarantee that welfare in the countries
concerned will rise after the imposition of trade sanctions, and it may well fall.
13
There is also a real concern on the part of developing countries, which cannot be lightly
dismissed, that if provisions were added to the WTO to enable sanctions to be imposed for lax
labour or environmental laws, these would be abused for protectionist purposes in developed
countries. It is abundantly clear that the developing countries will not accept any linkage
between trade sanctions and labour and environmental laws and it is fruitless for developed
countries to seek to exert pressure on the developing countries to acquiesce.
Nevertheless, the concerns of many civil society groups for the welfare of fellow citizens and
for the environment are genuine enough and cannot simply be ignored if broad support for the
WTO and further trade liberalisation are to be achieved. It is clear that globalisation has
generated losers as well as winners in most countries of the world and policy-makers have an
obligation to address the problems that more open trade brings.
The way forward on these issues at the international level seems to be to adopt an approach of
parallelism. There should be a commitment at the launch of the round to move forward on these
issues as the round proceeds but without any linkage with the negotiations themselves. Thus,
trade can be related to these issues in the political arena and the WTO should be involved to
help ensure that the trading system itself does not undermine internationally agreed rules
regarding labour rights or the environment. Nevertheless, any attempt to formally link trade
sanctions to implementation of labour rights and environmental rules must be rejected. The
political link could be developed in the form of the launch of a multi-institutional forum on
labour standards and the environment at the same time as the new round of trade negotiations is
initiated.
One challenge for these fora will be to identify means of ensuring more effective
implementation of internationally agreed rules without recourse to trade sanctions. Here the
objective could be to develop appropriate standards and codes of practice together with means
of monitoring compliance and then to design positive responses in recognition of successful
implementation in developing countries. Here trade preferences could play a useful role. There
are provisions in this regard in the GSP schemes of the EU and the US as well as in the various
bilateral trade agreements that these countries have signed. However, it would be useful to
construct a consistent global approach rather than the piecemeal bilateral policies that exist at
present.
Primary responsibility for addressing labour rights and environmental issues should lie with
institutions that have them as their direct focus. In the case of labour standards such an
institution exists, the International Labour Organisation (ILO). An international environmental
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agency has yet to be created. The WTO would be involved to discuss cases where violations of
core labour standards are directly related to trade and investment. In the main, however, lack of
implementation of core labour rights, and in many cases environmental rules, is a development
issue rather than a trade issue. Thus, discussion should involve the multilateral development
agencies and NGOs with relevant expertise and experience. We now consider separately, but
briefly, issues relating to social development and then the environment. We finish the section
with a short discussion of further ‘trade and’ issues, those relating to competition policy and the
investment.
Trade and social development
The concerns of civil society groups relating to trade and labour rights are perhaps better
addressed within the broader context of trade and social development. Here there is a need for a
better understanding of the links between trade, economic development and social development.
The policy objective must be to ensure that trade and social development expand together and
that the social benefits of trade liberalisation are maximised. In the main, this requires attention
to non-trade policies such as labour market regulations, education and training and involves
careful consideration of technical assistance programmes and other forms of aid. The key issue
for trade policy is the time-scale and phasing of trade liberalisation. The challenge for the
international community is how to facilitate the adoption of necessary flanking policies to
accompany trade reform to ensure that the benefits that flow from trade are harnessed to
improve social development. It is in this context that one should consider the issue of corporate
responsibility and the role of voluntary codes of business conduct, which can be complementary
to increasing governmental responsibility for basic social standards and the development of
suitable global values.
It is implementation that lies at the heart of the problem of core labour standards. Here,
however, here there is no simple answer. What is needed is the instigation of a process that
looks for solutions within a multi-institutional setting – a global forum on trade and labour
standards – which is long-lasting and with dialogue taking place outside a new round of trade
negotiations. Such a forum should have a broad membership, including the WTO and the ILO,
and should provide for the joint analysis of problems, the sharing of experiences and the search
for appropriate solutions. During its work the forum would benefit from contacts and exchanges
with civil society groups. The forum should be used to demonstrate that social development and
economic development are compatible in the long-term and that adoption of core labour
standards is domestically beneficial and does not undermine international competitiveness.
Trade and the environment
There are real public concerns that a more extensive and effective system of global governance
is require to address the issue of the sustainability and economic development. This reflects the
fact that whilst the international community has been quite successful in developing and
implementing global rules for trade and economic relations, it has been much less successful in
addressing environmental problems, many of which require joint or global solutions. Thus, there
are demands for a new model of global governance that has sustainability as its centrepiece.
Here again the establishment of policies and mechanisms to tackle the transboundary
environmental challenges that the world faces should come from environmental authorities. The
role of the WTO must be to ensure that international trade and investment policies do not
conflict with, or undermine, internationally agreed environmental policies. It is worth noting
that the agreement establishing the WTO explicitly mentions the objective of sustainable
development and the protection and preservation of the environment.
Of the ‘trade and’ issues, discussion related to the environment is the most advanced at the
WTO, where there has been a Committee on Trade and Environment since 1994. This debateTHE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND
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takes place in the context that implementation of appropriate environment rules is linked to
economic development and that typically trade liberalisation plays a crucial role in advancing
development. In principle then trade and environmental policy objectives  can be entirely
consistent. The main issues that the WTO must address are how legitimate environmental
concerns can be advanced without compromising trade liberalisation and how further trade
liberalisation can be achieved without undermining environmental objectives. In short the
nature of the challenge is to make trade and environmental policies work together to raise social
welfare. The mechanisms by which this can be achieved have yet to be worked out.
Clearly, the creation of a global environmental agency would relieve some of the
pressure that the WTO is facing with regard to the issue of sustainability and would
allow for a more general approach to environmental issues rather than simply
concentrating on matters relating to international trade and investment. For example, a
flight from the east to the west coast of the US may generate as much air pollution as a
flight across the Atlantic. The former does not qualify as international trade whereas the
latter does. Similar concerns relate to other forms of transport. Nevertheless, the
creation of such an agency, at least in the short-term, appears a remote possibility and so
a large responsibility will rest on the WTO in addressing the environmental implications
of trade liberalisation whilst ensuring that the environment is not used simply as a
pretext for protectionism.
What can the WTO reasonably be expected to do? At present the key issue for the WTO should
be how to ensure consistency and avoid conflict with the implementation of the various
multilateral environmental agreements that have been signed, such as CITES, the Basle
Convention on Hazardous Waste and the Montreal Protocol. There is concern that countries
facing trade penalties for violating or refusing to sign a multilateral environmental agreement
could challenge such sanctions in the WTO. Under the NAFTA, trade actions consistent with
multilateral environmental agreements are not inconsistent with NAFTA commitments. A
similar approach could be adopted by the WTO subject to some provisions that ensure that the
environmental agreement concerned has the support of the vast majority of WTO members and
so protects developing countries from pressure from other countries to adopt inappropriate
environmental policies or suffer trade sanctions.
In the context of a new round it has been suggested that the WTO could contribute to global
environment objectives by ensuring the liberalisation of trade in environmental products, goods
and services that are deemed to be ecologically friendly. This could concentrate initially on the
removal of tariffs on environmental goods but then also consider access restrictions on the
provision of environmental services. It is also argued that agreement to reduce subsidies in
agriculture and fisheries could have important environmental benefits.
A more difficult issue, but one which that strengthen the WTO would be a clarification of
Article XX which provides for exceptions from GATT/WTO obligations for specific policy
objectives if similar restrictions are applied domestically, if the measures are necessary to meet
the policy objective and if they are not a ‘disguised restriction on trade’. This would help to
make apparent when and how the implementation of environmental policies is WTO-consistent.
Of particular importance here is that at present the WTO rules are focused almost entirely on
product rules and leave little scope for policies that are related to production processes, which
often lie at the heart of environmental issues.
Trade and competition policy
Strong competition laws can be necessary to ensure that the benefits of trade liberalisation are
actually realised and maximised. In this regard it has been argued that all WTO members should
implement policies that constrain cartels and other anti-competitive practices. This in itself isPAUL BRENTON
18
not a controversial proposal. What is contentious is whether there should be binding multilateral
disciplines on competition policy within the aegis of the WTO together with formal mechanisms
for cooperation on multi-jurisdictional mergers.
At present many WTO members do not have active competition policies. As such binding rules
on competition policy would have immense institutional and resource implications for
developing countries. On the other hand, there are cases where an agreement on competition
policies could be of particular benefit to developing countries. For example, in helping to instil
greater discipline on the use of anti-dumping measures and in ensuring that the benefits of the
TRIPS agreement are maximised (or costs are minimised).
The Singapore Ministerial meeting established a working group on competition policy issues,
although this body has no mandate for negotiations. This issue is one where, given the wide
variety of views on the subject amongst members, formal negotiations at this time are likely to
overburden the agenda.  Again, the most appropriate response appears to be one of initiating
parallel discussions which can help to clarify the relevant issues and allow countries to identify
their own interests and positions. If it were to become apparent that there are certain issues, or
core practices, where consensus could be achieved then it might be that these could be
infiltrated into the agenda of trade negotiations subject to the approval of the members.
A global forum on competition policy building upon and extending the work of the WTO
Working Group could enhance the efforts being made by anti-trust authorities and the
International Bar Association to promulgate mutual understanding between different authorities
and so contribute to the convergence of thinking and working practices around the world
without pushing ahead towards the harmonisation of rules. The work of the WTO Working
Group should continue to concentrate on the interface between trade and competition policy and
generate greater understanding of the issues and identify areas of particular interest for WTO
members.
Trade and investment
The value of sales by the overseas affiliates of multinational firms now exceeds the value of
traditional arms-length exports of goods and services. Yet, there are no multilateral rules
governing foreign direct investment analogous to those that cover traditional trade in goods and
services. It has been increasingly recognised that foreign direct investment by multinational
firms can be an important source of not only investment but also of technology and techniques.
Further, it is often argued (although the empirical evidence is not yet compelling) that the
technologies and techniques spill over from the affiliate to other local firms so that FDI can
contribute to more general increases in productivity and income. As a result most countries are
now keen to attract investment by multinational firms as reflected in the fact that over 1600
bilateral investment treaties were signed in 1999 (Hoekman and  Saggi; 1999). On the hand,
many countries also implement policies that place particular requirements on multinationals and
constrain foreign investments in certain ways.
Separate agreement was reached in the Uruguay Round on applying disciplines to investment
measures that can distort trade in goods and services. For trade in goods, the agreement is
effectively limited to interpretation and clarification of the application of existing provisions
regarding national treatment and quantitative restrictions to trade-related investment measures.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures does not address issues such as export
performance and transfer of technology requirements and, more generally, does not cover
domestic policy regimes that limit the rights of establishment by foreign firms or increase the
costs of market access. Provisions related to investment in services are contained in the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) where foreign direct investment is treated as one modeTHE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND
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of supply so that there is considerable scope for far-reaching commitments within the structure
of the existing GATS agreement.
The WTO established a working group on trade and investment in 1996 to undertake analytical
work on the links between trade and investment but not as a forum for negotiations on new
disciplines. The issue for the new round is whether it is appropriate at this point to include
substantive negotiations on consistent global rules on investment policies. Currently, the
position of members is mixed. Investment is an issue where some members perceive the
potential for considerable gains from further disciplines and that there is substantial scope for
negotiations in a new round, whilst at the same time there is unwavering resistance to any
negotiations from other members. Again, a policy of parallel discussions building on the
continuing work of the WTO working party offers the most appropriate response at present.
This would allow a dialogue between all the interested parties without formal negotiations. If
these discussions were to identify for all concerned members the scope for beneficial
negotiations, then these could perhaps be introduced at some stage during the round.
On the other hand, there is the possibility that progress on investment issues related to services
could be made within the context of the mandated negotiations under the GATS without the
need for any formal negotiations on investment. Given the large and increasing importance of
the service sector in most economies and the fundamental role that foreign direct investment can
play in accessing overseas markets in service products, progress in increasing the transparency
and stability of conditions governing overseas investment in services could have substantial
economic benefits.
To conclude, including the ‘trade and’ issues on the agenda for the next round would
not only be divisive, it would also overburden the negotiations. Thus, whilst the issues
must be dealt with, the most suitable approach is to consider each of them in a separate
multi-institutional forum in parallel, but not directly linked to, the trade negotiations.
The WTO should be involved to help ensure that the trading system itself does not
undermine internationally agreed rules regarding labour rights or the environment, but
any attempt to formally link trade sanctions to implementation of labour rights and
environmental rules must be rejected. With regard to competition policy and investment there is
considerable interest in negotiations from some members but implacable resistance from others.
Hence, at present it is not practical to include these issues on the negotiating agenda at the
launch of the round. However, discussions and analysis of these issues should continue and if,
as a part of this process, a consensus towards substantive negotiations materialises then they
could be filtered into the negotiating agenda at a later stage.
4.2.2 The Dispute Settlement Procedure
The prompt and effective settlement of disputes lies at the heart of the credibility of rules-based
systems by providing for predictability and stability of obligations and rights. Institutional
enforcement mechanisms are particularly important to developing countries, which are unable to
exert pressure or credible threats when large countries violate their rights. During the Uruguay
Round negotiations, it became clear to many of the parties that there was a need to enhance the
dispute settlement system. There was dissatisfaction with the way that under the GATT the
creation of panels to resolve disputes and the adoption of reports could be blocked. The
response was to create a binding dispute settlement system with a more automatic process. The
Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) was one of the main features of the Uruguay Round and to
many, one of its greatest achievements, without which a large number of the Contracting Parties
would have been reluctant to implement many of the extensive commitments that were being
discussed. Under the DSP, the rights of members are clearer and more stable and predictable.
A number of indicators suggest that the DSP has been a success:PAUL BRENTON
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•  The number of consultations sought by WTO members has been on average each year much
higher than under the GATT system,
14 which can be interpreted as reflecting increased
confidence by WTO members in the new dispute settlement system.
15
•  Consultations have been sought by all types of WTO members. Most significantly,
developing as well as developed countries have used the system.
•  A relatively high proportion of cases have not required the establishment of a panel and
have been resolved through the process of consultation. This suggests that, in general, the
procedures that have been established are conducive to the resolution of disputes. In many
cases, before the need for a panel arises the jurisprudence of the GATT and the WTO make
clear the likely outcome of the case and so propel the parties concerned towards a settlement
that is consistent with the interpretation of the rules given in previous cases.
16 This does,
however, entail that panels will tend to be convened for difficult cases where GATT and
WTO jurisprudence does not provide a clear signal to the parties of the probable result.
Necessarily, this means that panel rulings are likely to be contentious.
•  Nevertheless, the extent of compliance with panel rulings has been high. This has been true
for decisions that have favoured complaints brought by developing countries as well as
those by developed countries.
17 There are some high-profile problem cases, particularly
involving the EU and the US on bananas, hormones in beef, and the FSC, all of which had
been litigated prior to the creation of the WTO.
In the main, observers seem to feel that the DSP is working reasonably well, and there are no
strong calls for a major overhaul of the system. However, this is qualified by a few glitches and
faults that have, perhaps not surprisingly, become apparent with the implementation and
operation of the new system. Thus, there is scope for change to improve the functioning of the
system and discussion, and negotiation of these could be an important part of the next round of
trade talks. Several key issues require attention:
•  compensation or suspension of concessions in the case of non-compliance with panel
rulings,
•  the more effective participation of the developing countries,
•  transparency and the involvement of external parties such as NGOs
•  the need for professional panels, and
•  the broader issue of the balance between the political and legal bodies within the WTO.
The issues of implementation of panel rulings and remedies for non-compliance
In response to an adverse panel ruling, a member of the WTO can either change the policy
concerned to ensure compliance with the ruling and WTO obligations, agree compensation with
the parties concerned, or face the suspension of concessions from the other parties involved in
the dispute. In practice a number of problems have arisen with this process. Firstly, the way in
which a losing party brings its policies into line with WTO rules is usually left to that party
itself. Panels can make specific suggestions but have usually limited themselves to standard
recommendations to remove violations. In some cases, such as the dispute between the EU and
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the US over bananas, there has been subsequent disagreement as to whether changes in policies
by the losing party have been sufficient to meet their obligations. Another panel is then required
to assess the sufficiency of the losing party’s actions. In this way the restoration of a member’s
rights can be denied over a long period. Thus, the current system is not very well equipped to
deal with situations where the losing party makes only minor or cosmetic changes to policies
found to be in violation of commitments by a panel.
Secondly, there is some uncertainty under the Dispute Settlement Procedure of what constitutes
a reasonable time period in which to implement the findings of a panel. There seems to be a
rather strong presumption of a 15-month period.
18 Some observers feel that this time period
should not be rigidly applied and that particular circumstances should be taken into account,
such as whether enabling legislation is required or not. This would also allow special
consideration to be given to the problems of developing countries where institutional change is
much more difficult to implement in a short time period.
In addition there is also some contention over the time period following disagreement over non-
implementation of a ruling. Article 21.5 lays down that such a disagreement should be referred
to the original panel which must then report in 90 days. On the other hand, Article 22.2 allows
the winning party to request authorisation for retaliation within 30 days of the end of the
reasonable period permitted for implementation. Clarification of these issues could be a useful
part of the next round.
Thus, under the present system the effective and speedy resolution of disputes relies in great
measure on the good will of the losing parties and on the extent of the moral imperative that
countries perceive to adhere to their obligations.  In this regard the examples set by the US and
the EU are crucial – and here both have failed miserably in the past five years. One way in
which the procedure could be improved would be for complainants to request a specific remedy
and for panels to rule on whether it would be acceptable or not.
19 An issue that could help avoid
these problems is that of compensation.
In some cases members have difficulty implementing decisions of the DSP, for political or
broader societal reasons and this can lead to some of the problems mentioned above with regard
to the sufficiency of policy changes following panel reports. Although in principle there is
nothing to stop countries offering and seeking compensation, in practice this has not played a
role in the resolution of disputes. At present it would appear that the mechanism for
compensation is inadequate in the DSU and this leads to a tendency towards the use of sanctions
when countries fail to implement panel decisions.
Retaliation entails raising barriers to trade that in general is detrimental to the retaliating country
and to the principle of liberal trade. In addition, retaliation often affects companies not involved
in the dispute and this reduces the certainty of the rules-based system for private individuals and
companies that participate in the global trading system. Retaliation is an inefficient way of
forcing recalcitrant partners to adhere to their obligations. A superior approach would be to
provide mechanisms that encourage compensation in terms of the reduction of other trade
barriers through the re-negotiation of concessions. Because of the MFN principle, the net impact
of dispute resolution would be more liberal trade.
The problem would remain of how to remove the violation at the heart of the case. One answer
would be that compensation would not remove the need of the losing party to comply with its
obligations but would allow it to negotiate an agreed timetable towards implementation of a
change in policy acceptable to the winning party or as laid down in recommendations by the
panel. Nevertheless, good faith on the part of the losing party would be required in good
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measure. However, the problem that would remain would be what happens to compensation
when the violation is actually removed? When (and if) this does occur, compensation in the
form of reduced tariffs can only be removed if they are in actual rates rather than bound rates.
Although compensation is very unusual in dispute resolution, it does play an important role in
cases where a member country seeks to modify the concessions or obligations it has previously
adopted. The most notable example is the formation or enlargement of customs unions when the
application of the common external tariff leads some members to raise tariffs above the rates at
which they were bound. This was the case in the previous enlargement of the EU to include
Austria, Finland and Sweden and took the form of negotiated reductions in tariff rates. Thus,
negotiated compensation in the form of tariff reductions is not unprecedented and, previous
experience would suggest, difficult and sometimes contentious but in the end not overly
problematic. Thus, the introduction of mechanisms which stimulate countries to negotiate
compensation prior to the implementation of sanctions could help to remove some of the
contention that arises when panel rulings are not implemented and would insure that the DSP
had a liberal rather than a protectionist leaning.
Facilitating the participation of developing countries
Effective enforcement requires that violations of commitments are identified and challenged.
Developing countries face particular problems in using the Dispute Settlement Procedure both
in terms of identifying violations and preparing cases, whilst resource constraints hamper their
ability to participate in the Dispute Settlement Procedure once a case is launched. Limited
resources entail that developing countries are much less well represented in Geneva than
developed countries and suffer from a general lack of expertise and resources in their domestic
administrations to identify violations of importance to them and to formulate and organise
cases.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO provides for technical assistance to be
provided by the WTO Secretariat to developing countries. However, this facility is very limited
and is generally deemed to be inadequate by developing countries. Legal technical assistance is
provided by two part-time academic experts and is provided only after a developing country
member has decided to submit a dispute. No assistance is given in identifying practices that
undermine the rights of developing countries or in assessing which cases are likely to be won.
As a result most advice is given when developing countries are the respondents in cases.
Thus, careful consideration should be given to proposals, such as the Advisory Centre on WTO
Law, which increase the ability of developing countries to bring cases to the Dispute Settlement
Procedure. There is a need for greater resources and expertise that will allow developing
countries to identify and evaluate cases of interest to them. In addition mechanisms could be
developed that assist developing countries in analysing the economic implications of different
ways of implementing their obligations in cases brought against them.
At present the timetable for the implementation of panel decisions are dictated in an entirely
legalistic framework and reflect the rights of the successful plaintiff. This is appropriate for
cases between countries at similar levels of economic development with both having strong
institutional frameworks. It is less relevant for developing countries where the reallocation of
scarce administrative resources can have important development implications. It is therefore
argued that the difficulties that developing countries face in implementing decisions should be
taken into account. This issue is not one where there is a reluctance to implement obligations
but rather where economic and institutional limitations constrain a developing country from
implementation over time periods that are feasible for developed countries only.
Hence, it has been proposed that the implementation period for developing countries should
reflect economic problems that a particular country faces. Also, in some cases there may beTHE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND
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important adjustment costs from panel rulings for countries not directly involved in the dispute
and that the problems that these countries encounter should be taken into account.
20 More
careful analysis of the economic effects of panel rulings would also allow for more effective
coordination with the World Bank and the IMF to provide adjustment assistance and short-term
relief. Here, consideration could be given to the possible role of NGOs in providing information
and analysis that would contribute to an accurate assessment of the economic and development
implications of particular policies adopted, and the timeframe for implementation, in developing
countries. As we mention below, however, there are considerable practical hurdles to this
suggestion, for example, in deciding which organisations can contribute and how that
contribution takes place.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding contains certain provisions that refer directly to
developing countries. For example, Article 4.10 states that during consultations ‘Members
should give special attention to developing country Members’ particular problems and interests’
whilst in Article 21.8 it says that ‘if the case in one brought by a developing country Member,
in considering what appropriate action might be taken, the DSP shall take into account not only
the trade coverage of measures complained of, but also their impact on the economy of
developing country Members concerned.” One task for a new round would be to develop
mechanisms that provide more formal means of implementing these sentiments.
Chinese accession to the WTO and the Dispute Settlement Procedure
Chinese accession will be an important step to the fulfilment of a truly global organisation; the
key remaining applicants being Russia and Ukraine. The precise impact of Chinese accession on
future negotiations is difficult to predict although it is possible that by acting as a team leader
for developing countries Chinese involvement could act as a catalyst to new momentum and to
successful future negotiations. With regard to the terms of accession it is clear that there is a
firm commitment in China by the central government to abide by WTO obligations.
The key issue regarding China’s participation is implementation and how the other contracting
parties will respond to the expected many cases of non-compliance that will initially arise. Will
existing members resort to the Dispute Settlement Procedure? If so, it is likely that there will be
a very large number of cases against China. The dilemma facing members such as the EU
member states and the US is that, despite best intentions, China may not be able to quickly
respond to change the situation that is causing non-compliance in all cases where there DSP
rules against China. But if cases are not brought against China this will undermine the use of the
DSP against countries that are also violating obligations but are in a position to implement
necessary changes and comply in the short-term. In addition, if Chinese obligations are not
rigorously monitored and enforced by other Contracting Parties then the confidence of other
recent applicants who have striven to ensure compliance will be undermined, and unhelpful
precedents may be set for future members.
This problem could be reduced by a number of approaches: through careful discussion of
transition periods for China to implement obligations; through effort to settle cases in the
consultation phase of the DSP; and through the use of lobbying and overseas missions in China
to effect change; through the acceptance of concessions elsewhere when China is unable to
quickly effect the changes required by the finding of the DSP. Again, if more flexible
procedures were developed that looked at implementation in the context of the development
process, then these problems would become more manageable and less divisive.
External transparency and the involvement of NGOs
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A further issue related to the DSP is that of transparency and the participation of civil society.
There is some concern about the amount of public access to the Dispute Settlement Procedure in
terms of provision of information and participation in panel hearings. With regard to
information, the DSP is criticised for being overly secret. Some progress has been made in
making documentation more readily available. But there are demands that panel hearings should
be open to a limited number of non-governmental observers, including the press. Whether this is
feasible requires careful consideration. It would improve the public’s perception of the WTO
and would add to the credibility of the procedures, but practical problems of how and to whom
access would be granted would have to resolved.
There are increasing demands from civil society for greater participation through the submission
of communications, known as amicus briefs. This is a more difficult issue. The Appellate Body
has already ruled that first-level panels can receive and examine communications from NGOs,
although there is no obligation for them to do so. Civil society groups would like a more
formalised role in providing communications to dispute cases. Again this would improve the
public appearance of the WTO, but there is a genuine fear in developing countries that such a
move would in practice allow only for the participation of developed country NGOs and that
this would influence panel decisions against developing countries.
It is clear that in some cases NGOs can play a valuable role at the WTO in providing specific
expertise to improve the quality of decision-making. However, again there needs to be some
deliberation concerning the practical feasibility of such involvement. Participation would
require practical means of identifying the relevant NGOs for particular issues. In addition it
would be necessary to clearly define when, how and in what form and quantity submissions
could be made by NGOs so as to ensure that the Dispute Settlement Procedure does not become
overburdened. This could be done in the form of regulations that all panels would follow except
where explicit reasons for not doing so are provided.
21
If a means of allowing NGO involvement were to be found, then guarantees would have to be
put in place to ensure balance and fairness for all WTO members. At a minimum, all parties to a
dispute would have to be provided with easy access to such communications, through the Web
for example, and given ample opportunity for response. There would also have to be clear
guidelines on how panels would process the arguments from NGOs. Input from secretariat staff
would be inevitable, and this has resource implications for the WTO. Limitations on the size of
communications would have to be imposed. Finally, if the decision were to be taken to allow for
broader participation then the panel and panelists would have to become more professional.
Professionalisation of panels
The current system employs part-time panelists on an ad hoc basis.  Panelists are typically
diplomats from country delegations perceived to be neutral in the dispute. Whilst they have
good reputations for judgement and familiarity with WTO procedures, some feel that they often
lack legal training or experience and may not necessarily be able to follow in detail the
development of WTO jurisprudence over a long period.
One solution to this problem, as well as that arising from an increased role for NGOs, is the
professionalisation of panels. Panelists would, for example, be appointed for 4 or 5-year terms.
As such the panelists would be able to better follow the development of WTO jurisprudence and
experience of legal issues relating to international trade could be included in the selection
criterion. The professionalisation of panels would probably lead to the more rapid conclusion of
cases and greater consistency of outcomes. It has been estimated that with three-member panels
and the number of disputes that are currently initiated each year then 18 panelists would need to
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be appointed, which would have significant implications for the current level of WTO
resources.
22
Constitutionalisation of the WTO
For some members the use of professional panels implies an enhancement of the judicial
process and thereby, the further constitutionalisation of the WTO. Such a development would
then have to be accompanied by a revision and a deepening of the control that the members are
able to exert over the legal process. At present it is difficult for the members to question or
overturn a decision by the Appellate body whilst at the same time the Appellate body is seen to
be law-making and involved in what are sensitive political debates. On the one hand, this
reflects political failures in the parties to disputes who use the Dispute Settlement Procedure to
provide a judicial solution to an issue that requires a political answer. On the other hand, greater
scope needs to be provided for diplomatic involvement in politically sensitive disputes. The
border between international and national rules should be ‘determined by governments and not
by judges’.
23
A feature of agreements between a large number of diverse parties is that the final clauses are
often vague, which reflects the difficulty of obtaining a compromise. This lack of precision is
often a deliberate decision by negotiators to provide for a broad-based consensus amongst all
the parties, which in the WTO is a precondition for a successful outcome. The problem then is
by whom and how should these clauses subsequently be interpreted? Under the GATT it was
generally expected that such problems of interpretation would be subject to diplomatic solution.
Under the WTO it appears that the judicial arm is being increasing used to preside over such
issues. As a result, there are fears in many countries that the reach of the WTO is undermining
domestic decision-making and is compromising national sovereignty. Often these fears are
overstated. Nevertheless, it would appear that some form of clarification is required on the
domain of WTO judicial decisions whilst ensuring that WTO disciplines and enforcement
mechanisms are not weakened or undermined.
To conclude, in terms of facilitating an improvement in the functioning and efficiency of the
Dispute Settlement Procedure, the new round should:
•  Implement mechanisms that encourage compensation rather than retaliation.
•  Identify means of allowing for the more effective participation of developing countries.
Developing countries need greater capacities to identify violations as well as assistance in
responding to complaints. Development considerations should be acknowledged when
decisions regarding the timescale for implementation of panel rulings are taken.
•  Specify ways of improving the transparency of the Dispute Settlement Process, through de-
restriction of documents and perhaps public hearings, and of exploiting the expertise of
external parties such as NGOs. If the latter takes place more formally, then guarantees
would have to be put in place to ensure balance and fairness for all WTO members.
•  Consider the case for professional panels together with an assessment of the balance
between the political and legal bodies within the WTO. Ways of increasing diplomatic
involvement in politically sensitive disputes should be investigated without any
undermining of existing disciplines or enforcement mechanisms.
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4.2.3 Legitimacy and external transparency
The legitimacy of the WTO depends not only upon internal transparency and the way that
individual members participate in the organisation but also on how it interacts with and reflects
the views and demands of wider society. It must be remembered that the WTO is an
organisation of national governments with decisions being made on the basis of consensus.
Thus, in principle if domestic political systems were working perfectly then there would be no
demands regarding the democratisation of the WTO and NGOs would perceive no need to
request greater involvement. The fact that this is the case reflects poorly on politicians and the
lack of effort to promote discussion of trade and trade policy issues and of the WTO and its role
in the international economy.
At present the main elements in demands for greater external transparency include greater
openness in terms of providing information and documents, the ability to make submissions to
panels in dispute settlement cases, and more participation in WTO activities such as committee
meetings. The first issue is relatively uncontroversial. The WTO has done much to make
information more readily available to the public through the internet and by derestricting
documents more quickly. But more could be done to improve the provision of information. Data
sources, such as the integrated database which contains information on national commitments,
should be made freely available to enable all those who wish to analyse the commitments to do
so. This would improve the reputation of the WTO. However, there are limits to this process.
Some documents, for example, those subject to negotiation, must remain confidential until after
agreement has been reached.
With regard to the participation of NGOs, it is accepted that such organisations could play an
important role at the WTO in terms of providing expertise and information improve the quality
of the analysis of WTO related-issues and contributes to better decision-making. The precise
role that NGOs can play in dispute settlement was briefly discussed earlier. However, the
weight given to amicus briefs in judicial decisions is often slight so that it is most likely that
with time these organisations will be looking for additional ways in which they can influence
the WTO to a greater extent. More generally, whilst more formal channels of the participation
of NGOs should be explored, it is crucial that they should not become involved in the lobbying
of negotiators or secretariat officials. This would be a step backwards in terms of the democratic
accountability of the WTO.
Negotiators are typically civil servants seeking to achieve mandates set down, for most
members, by democratically elected governments. Negotiators themselves cannot change these
mandates and hence there can be no role for lobbyists at the WTO itself. Any deal that
negotiators conclude is subject to subsequent democratic review and confirmation. Thus, the
lobbying activities of NGOs should be focused upon national governments and parliaments. The
fact that NGOs are targeting the WTO is perhaps symptomatic of their lack of trust in the
democratic process in many countries and the (perceived) lack of inclusiveness of that process.
Hence, although there is a need for attention to be given to the issue of how the specific
expertise of NGOs can be effectively utilised by the WTO it is national governments that have a
responsibility to engage in a more effective dialogue with civil society groups and explain to the
public more carefully the rationale behind positions they take on trade policy issues.
In conclusion, the primary responsibility for engaging in a more effective dialogue with civil
society groups lies with national governments. Nevertheless, to improve its relationship with
wider society, the WTO should:
•  Consider ways of further improving the provision of information and data and assess the
feasibility of giving limited public access to meetings and panel hearings. However, some
documents must remain confidential until after decisions have been made and agreement
has been reached.THE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND
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•  Identify mechanisms by which the specific expertise of particular NGOs can be effectively
utilised to improve the quality of decision-making at the WTO.
5. Conclusions
In this report we have discussed the mainly systemic issues that have arisen in the aftermath of
the Uruguay Round and the first six years of the WTO. In general these are ailments in need of
treatment if the WTO is to fulfil its role of facilitating improvements in global income whilst, in
conjunction with other global institutions, ensuring that complementary objectives regarding
social justice and development and the environment are not compromised and are actually
advanced.
There is a need for a refocusing of the WTO to better reflect the particular problems and
constraints that developing countries face and to place trade liberalisation more firmly in the
context of the process of economic development. Together with mechanisms that more fully
integrate the developing countries into WTO decision-making procedures and improve the
functioning of the Dispute Settlement Procedure, this will act to cement the legitimacy of the
WTO in the eyes of all members and help to generate a common vision for the WTO and its
place in the global institutional framework. If at the same the WTO acts to improve external
transparency and national governments activate a deeper dialogue with civil society on the role
and impact of the WTO and trade liberalisation, then understanding and acceptance of the role
of the WTO should improve which in turn should facilitate a more positive engagement with
civil society groups.
In the main these are changes that will improve the way that the WTO functions to implement
the rules-based international trading system and to organise negotiations to reduce trade
barriers. It is the implementation of the latter in practice that underlie increases in economic
welfare and help to intensify the development process. In general, trade barriers waste resources
either because they raise costs but generate no revenues, such as customs inefficiencies, or
because they encourage wasteful behaviour by groups determined to appropriate the rents that
accompany trade policy interventions. Hence, if the next round is to contribute significantly to
the advancement of economic welfare in all members, then progress will have to made in
reducing tariff barriers, in liberalising trade in agriculture and services, in advancing trade
facilitation issues. We have argued in this report that progress on these barriers can best be
made in the context of a round that allows for a broad range of issues regarding the WTO and
trade negotiations to be dealt with. The challenge is to proceed with this agenda in an
environment of mutual support, not suspicion, among members, together with a wide-ranging
and fruitful discussion of relevant issues in the wider society.PAUL BRENTON
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